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NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING PERSONS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: CURRENT
STATE OF THE LAW
America is a nation of immigrants, many of whom have come
to this country with little or no mastery of the English language.
Courts have been faced with the problems of non-
English-speaking criminal defendants throughout our history.
Only recently has the law in this area shown a significant pattern of
development.' The primary controversy in this area has focused
upon the defendant's right to an interpreter. The precedents thus
far have been constructed piecemeal, particularly during periods
of significant immigration. Only the latest cases have exhibited the
sophisticated analysis that is needed to evaluate the numerous
aspects of communication necessary to fair and just criminal pro-
ceedings. The traditional approach to a defendant's request for an
interpreter relies upon the unguided discretion of the trial judge,
who is constrained only by his duty to ensure that such defendants
receive fair trials. The purpose of this Note is to examine critically
the established responses to language difficulties in criminal trials.
Particular emphasis will be placed upon the developing trend
toward the judicial recognition of a right to an interpreter as a
method of protecting essential constitutional guarantees and upon
the establishment of affirmative duties in the trial court to secure
this right.
I
THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER
Non-English-speaking defendants are obviously handicapped
in understanding a criminal prosecution if they are not given the
assistance of an interpreter. Yet the Supreme Court recognizes no
constitutional right to a court-appointed interpreter. The Court
has handled only one case that directly presented the issue,
Perovich v. United States.2 There the Court held that the decision to
I The dates of the decisions analyzed in this Note vary considerably. Discussions of
nearly ancient precedents remain essential, however, in view of their continued vitality in
many jurisdictions. Cf. United States ex reL Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir.
1970), where the court noted that case law discussing the rights of non-English-speaking
persons in the criminal justice system is quite "sparse."
2 205 U.S. 86 (1907).
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appoint an interpreter to aid a defendant attempting to testify in
his own behalf rests entirely upon the discretion of the trial judge.3
No constitutional arguments were presented or considered, and
the Court's analysis of the issue was completed in one short
paragraph.4 Despite this superficial treatment of the question, the
Perovich decision has been followed by most courts, and has exhib-
ited an impressive ability to survive the modern expansion of the
constitutional rights of defendants in our criminal justice system.5
A. The Protection of Sixth Amendment Rights
Although no court has held that there is a direct constitutional
right to an interpreter, several courts have held that an interpreter
must be appointed to ensure the integrity of certain constitutional
rights. Usually these decisions have been based upon the sixth
amendment,6 particularly upon the right of a defendant to be
confronted with the witnesses against him. The right of confronta-
tion is "one of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,"
7
and has been applied to state prosecutions through the fourteenth
amendment.
8
The right of confrontation ensures that the defendant may be
physically present at his own trial. The Supreme Court has held
that neither the defendant nor his counsel may be permitted to
waive this right.9 But when language difficulties inhibit the defen-
dant's ability to understand the proceedings, his physical presence
3 See also Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123 (1906), where the Court found proper
jurisdiction to convict a deaf defendant of murder, holding that there was no denial of due
process by failure to repeat testimony to the defendant through an ear trumpet.
" No counsel appeared to represent the defendant on appeal, but the Court believed
that it could render a fair decision on the basis of its own review of the case and the brief
submitted by the district attorney.
' See, e.g., United States v. Barrios, 457 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Mammilato,
168 Cal. 207, 142 P. 58 (1914); State v. Aguelera, 326 Mo. 1205, 33 S.W.2d 901 (1930); State
v. Rusos, 127 Wash. 65, 219 P. 843 (1923).
6 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
8 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
9 In Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892), the Court reversed a conviction
for murder when the defendant's counsel was forced by the trial court to make juror
challenges with the prisoner absent. The Court stated:
A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after
indictment [is] found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner. ... [I]t
is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself or his counsel, to waive the
right to be personally present during trial.
Id at 372.
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in the courtroom may actually impinge upon the right of confron-
tation by presenting the facade of a just hearing in place of actual
fairness.
One of the first decisions to reverse a conviction for failure to
appoint an interpreter involved a deaf-mute.' 0 The court held that
the right of confrontation must include the defendant's right to
understand the accusations and evidence presented against him,
and must include the means to defend against those charges."
When presented with a confrontation that was limited to the mere
physical presence of the accused at trial, the court bluntly charac-
terized the confrontation as "meaningless . . . vain and useless.'
2
Trials conducted under such a misconception of the sixth amend-
ment, said the court, would be "useless" exercises, "bordering on
the farcical."' 3
Similarly, in State v. Vasquez,14 the Supreme Court of Utah
recognized that the right of confrontation cannot be limited to the
defendant's ability "to see the witness testifying against him and to
hear what the witness says.' 5 Such sensory impressions, severed
from an actual comprehension of "what is going on in the proceed-
ing," ' 6 were held insufficient to sustain a constitutionally proper
conviction of the accused. Thus, the trial court's refusal to provide
an interpreter for Vasquez, who spoke and understood only
Spanish, constituted reversible error.
Recently, several courts have used even stronger language in
concurring with Vasquez. The United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, in United States v. Carrion,'7 concluded that "the
right to confront witnesses would be meaningless if the accused
could not understand their testimony. . . ."I" Interpreters must be
provided as a right to non-English-speaking defendants because
"no defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an incom-
prehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment."' 9 The
10 Terry v. State, 21 Ala. App. 100, 105 So. 386 (1925).
11 Cases dealing with a defendant's mental competence to stand trial appear to forbid
the triatof an accused whose severe intellectual shortcomings prevent him from understand-
ing a criminal proceeding even though no language difficulties are present. See, e.g., Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). See also notes
94-98 and accompanying text infra.
11 Terry v. State, 21 Ala. App. 100, 102, 105 So. 386, 387 (1925).
1a Id.
14 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903 (1942).
,5 Id. at 449, 121 P.2d at 905.
18 Id.
17 488 F.2d 12 (lst Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974).
"I Id. at 14.
10 Id.
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Supreme Court of Arizona, in State v. Natividad,2 ° characterized an
uninterpreted trial of a non-English-speaking defendant as "fun-
damentally unfair.'
Slowly, courts are acknowledging the persuasiveness of these
confrontation arguments.22 Most of these decisions have buttressed
their conclusions by recognizing that the right to confront witness-
es includes the right of cross-examination,2 3 a right which the
Supreme Court has called "one of the safeguards essential to a fair
trial. 24 The first case to stress the importance of the defendant's
understanding of cross-examination, Garcia v. State,25 relied upon
the confrontation provision of the Texas Constitution. In Garcia,
the court reversed the defendants conviction because he alleged
that he could not understand the testimony which was crucial to
the prosecution's case.
2 6
In United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 27 the United States
Court of' Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized that the
defendant's right to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses
would be violated if he did not understand the precise nature of
their testimony. Thus the summaries of testimony by a translator,
offered to the defendant periodically during the trial, could not
support a conviction. The court believed that the effectiveness of a
20 111 Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d 730 (1974).
21 Id. at 194, 526 P.2d at 733.
It would be as though a defendant were forced to observe the proceedings from a
soundproof booth or seated out of hearing at the rear of the courtroom, being able
to observe but not comprehend the criminal processes whereby the state had put his
freedom in jeopardy. Such a trial comes close to being an invective against an
insensible object, possibly infringing upon the accused's basic "right to be present in
the courtroom at every stage of his trial."
Id. at 194, 526 P.2d at 733 (citations omitted).
22 See, e.g., United States ex reL Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970);
Gonzalez v. Virgin Islands, 109 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1940); United States ex rel. Navarro v.
Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Parra v. Page, 430 P.2d 834 (Old. Grim. 1967).
1 See Pointer v. .Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
24 Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931).
25 151 Tex. Grim. 593, 210 S.W.2d 574 (1948). The court stated:
The constitutional right of confrontation means something more than merely
bringing the accused and the witness face to face; it embodies and carries with it the
valuable right of cross-examination of the witness.
Unless appellant was in some manner, either through his counsel or an
interpreter, afforded knowledge of the testimony of the witness, the right of
cross-examination could not be exercised by him.
[ . . Ijn denying the appellant an interpreter, the trial court abused its
discretion and appellant was thereby denied a right granted by the Constitution.
Id. at 601-02, 210 S.W.2d at 580.
26 Id. at 601-02, 210 S.W.2d at 580.
27 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
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defense counsel's cross-examination is inevitably blunted when the
defendant is unable to respond to specific testimony and promptly
consult with his attorney. Periodic summaries were found to be less
than the constitutional equivalent of immediate interpretation by a
translator.
Negron thus reveals another communication link which must
be maintained if effective cross-examination is to take place-that
between the defendant and his attorney. Without an interpreter to
help transfer the thoughts of a non-English-speaking defendant to
an English-speaking attorney, the defendant's understanding of
the testimony offered against him is of no avail. 28 Several courts
have examined the need for effective attorney-client communica-
tion in terms of the adequacy of counsel's representation of the
accused 29 and the defendant's right to participate in the prepara-
tion of his own defense.30 The Supreme Court, in regard to an
28 See, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
970 (1974) (right to confront witnesses meaningless if accused unable to understand their
testimony); United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (two
interpreters needed at some trials: one to interpret witness's testimony for court, one to
interpret defendant's remarks to his attorney); State v. Natividad, 1II Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d
730 (1974) (defendant's inability to understand spontaneously testimony limits his attorney's
effectiveness on cross-examination).
29 See United States ex reL Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973); State
v. Natividad, I 11 Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d 730 (1974). Arguments centering on the inadequacy of
counsel may be quite difficult to sustain. Cf United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 796 (2d
Cir. 1963) (declining to vacate conviction upon claim of incompetent representation without
showing of "total failure to present the cause of the accused in any fundamental respect,"
quoting, Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978
(1963)); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950
(1950) (holding that relief upon claim of inadequacy of counsel available only upon showing
that representation had been so markedly inadequate "as to make the trial a farce and a
mockery of justice').
20 United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970); United States
ex reL Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973); State v. Natividad, 111 Ariz.
191, 526 P.2d 730 (1974). In Navarro, the court developed an interesting approach to the
problem of ensuring that the accused can participate fully in developing his defense:
[W]e feel it is important to note one aspect of the matter not heretofore given
much attention: the case may well arise where the defendant's constitutional rights
may require the presence of two interpreters. Such a situation might have arisen in
the present case during the period when the court interpreter was translating the
testimony of the Spanish-speaking witness for the benefit of the court, at which time
Navarro was unable to communicate with his lawyer. Such situations are likely to
occur in long trials where credibility is the central issue, where cross-examination of
witnesses speaking in the foreign tongue is therefore critical, but where interrup-
tion of the testimony (as in the present case) is impractical. Unless a second
interpreter is somehow furnished, the defendant's incapacity to respond to specific
testimony will "inevitably hamper the capacity of his counsel to conduct effective
cross-examination."
365 F. Supp. at 682-83 n.3, quoting United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386
(2d Cir. 1970).
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alleged mental incapacity to stand trial, has gone so far as to hold
that the inability of the defendant "to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding," unconstitutionally
vitiates the significance of the defendant's right to be present.31
Attorney-client communication is critical at other junctures of
the criminal process as well.32 Without a complete and meaningful
interview with his client, a defense attorney can rarely conduct an
adequate pretrial investigation of the facts surrounding the case.33
Some courts that apparently accept the importance of the
defendant's understanding of the proceeding and his ability to
communicate with his counsel in the cross-examination context,
have legitimized questionable refusals to supply interpreters on the
ground that the defense counsel understood the proceedings and
presumably would manage to communicate with his client.3 4 The
recent case of Salas v. State35 reflects the presumption that counsel
will interpret testimony for his client. The court found no denial of
due process when an interpreter was denied. This holding was
based primarily upon the defendant's waiver of his right to an
interpreter.36 Yet the court justified its ruling by stating that an
interpreter was not necessary because "there was no testimony as to
31 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1959).
32 See, e.g., People v. Vitale, 3 Ill. 2d 99, 119 N.E.2d 784 (1954) (ability of defendant's
attorney to translate for him properly assured that defendant understood meaning of his
change of plea); People v. Medina, 24 App. Div. 2d 516, 261 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1965)
(defendant's alleged language difficulty did not prevent his understanding of statutory
sentencing procedure).
"' See Rivera v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court held that
problems of communication between the defendant and his counsel, which allegedly pre-
vented counsel from completing an adequate pretrial investigation, did not constitute an
ample reason for reversal. The court supported the trial court's refusal t'o appoint an
interpreter here by stating that "it does not appear that such witnesses referred to by
petitioner had any material information that could be of value to the defense." Id. at 441.
34 See, e.g., The King v. Ah Har, 7 Haw. 319 (1888), wherein the court, relying on the
confrontation clause in Hawaii's territorial constitution, stated:
We agree with the contention of the counsel for the defendants, that the
constitutional right of an accused person "to meet the witnesses who are produced
against him face to face" is not complied with unless he is in some way made to
understand their evidence, in order to enable him to avail himself of his further
expressed constitutional right of cross-examining these witnesses, and also to meet
their evidence with his own proofs . ...
. . . But if the accused has counsel who understands the evidence, whether
directly from the witnesses or through an interpreter, the constitutional require-
ment is complied with, though the accused -himself may not understand it. It is
to be presumed that counsel will communicate with client.
Id. at 322. See also Escobar v. State, 30 Ariz. 159, 245 P. 356 (1926).
35 385 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Grim. App. 1965).
36 Id. at 861. See text accompanying notes 56-62 infra.
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whether counsel representing the appellant could or could not
make this interpretation [of a witness's testimony] for him. 37
Even when an attorney attempts to interpret the proceedings
for the defendant, the process presents unavoidable difficulties. An
attorney must concentrate upon his role as the defendant's legal
representative if he is to provide his client with an adequate
defense. Even the most expert and conscientious defense counsel
cannot adequately analyze the testimony of witnesses, protect the
evidentiary rights of his client, and prepare to challenge the
prosecution's case if, at the same time, he must translate the
proceedings. Certainly the precision of interpretation mandated by
Negron will be lacking when the court substitutes the defense
counsel for an interpreter.
Some courts have held that a difficulty in communication
between the accused and his attorney represents only one of the
many factors that must be considered in judging the adequacy of
counsel. In Cervantes v. Cox,38 a Mexican national brought a habeas
corpus proceeding claiming inadequate representation based on
incomplete communication with his lawyers. The court denied the
petitioner relief because he had exhibited sufficient knowledge of
English to be aware of the consequences of his guilty plea. The
court went on, however, to acknowledge that in certain cir-
cumstances the inability to communicate with an attorney would
deny the defendant constitutional rights.
3 9
B. Due Process
Courts have also found that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires the appointment of an interpreter
for the non-English-speaking accused. Over time the due process
clause has been the vehicle for multiple, and occasionally complex,
37 385 S.W.2d at 861.
38 350 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1965).
'9 The court in Cervantes noted:
Although we have no doubt that under extreme circumstances the inability of
an accused to communicate with his counsel may deny to him the right to effective
representation and actually result in the entry of a plea without understanding we
do not find the case at bar to be of such nature. There is no constitutional right, as
such, requiring the assistance of a court-appointed interpreter to supplement the
right to counsel. Nor is there a duty to an accused to furnish counsel who can
communicate freely with the accused in his native tongue. The existence of a
language barrier between counsel and client is merely one circumstance probing the
questions of whether the accused has been adequately represented by counsel and
has voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea.
Id. at 855.
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judicial doctrines. In the setting of a criminal proceeding, the denial
of due process has been defined as
the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must
find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the
acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily pre-
vents a fair trial.
4 0
Ex parte Cannis4' was an early case that relied upon the due
process clause to overturn a conviction on the basis that an in-
terpreter had been improperly denied. The Oklahoma Criminal
Court of Appeals, in reviewing a rape prosecution marked by
numerous constitutional violations, maintained that the "fair and
impartial" 42 trial guaranteed by the due process clauses in the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and in
article II, section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution included the
right to an interpreter when needed to enable the defendant to
understand the proceedings.
The Second Circuit in Negron, reiterating the reasoning of the
court in Cannis, stated that
the right that was denied Negron seems to us even more conse-
quential than the right of confrontation. Considerations of fair-
ness, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and the potency of
our adversary system of justice forbid that the state should
prosecute a defendant who is not present at his own trial, unless
by his conduct he waives that right. And it is equally imperative
that every criminal defendant-if the right to be present is to
have meaning-possess "sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."
Otherwise, "[tihe adjudication loses its character as a reasoned
interaction . . . and becomes an invective against an insensible
object."43
Thus, several courts have determined that the problems of con-
frontation, cross-examination, and adequacy of counsel involved in
the refusal to provide an interpreter to a non-English-speaking
defendant combine to deprive that person of his general right to a
40 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 643 (1974); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973).
41 173 P.2d 586 (Okl. Crim. 1946).
42 Id at 594.
43 United States ex reL Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970) (citations
omitted). The court in Negron did not specifically refer to nor cite Cannis.
[Vol. 61:289
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fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause, as well as his
specific rights under the sixth amendment.44
C. Knowing and Intelligent Waivers
Some courts have favored the appointment of an interpreter
to ensure that the waiver by a non-English-speaking defendant of
his constitutional rights is made knowingly and intelligently. In
Parra v. Page,45  the accused was a 23-year-old, uneducated
Mexican-American migrant worker who understood only Spanish.
The court reversed the conviction based on a plea of guilty and
held that an interpreter should have been provided to inform the
defendant of his rights.
In Landeros v. State,46 the court approved the defendant's
application to withdraw his guilty plea and substitute a plea of not
guilty. The court concluded that the non-English-speaking defen-
dant did not understand the explanation of his constitutional rights,
recited to him in English. Therefore, any waiver he made could
not have been knowing and intelligent. Yet, the trial judge in this
case refused to appoint an interpreter to aid the accused.
In re Muraviov47 involved an alleged waiver by the defendant
of his right to counsel at trial. No interpreter was present either at
the arraignment or at the trial. The court held, therefore, that the
petitioner's inability to speak or understand English established
44 United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In State v.
Natividad, 111 Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d 730 (1974) and State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637, 513 P.2d
697 (1973), the respective courts supported the general right of a non-English-speaking
defendant to assistance of an interpreter. In Natividad, the court remanded in order to
determine the nature and severity of any language difficulty. In Faafiti, the court rejected
the defendant's contention that his lack of complete familiarity with English required the
appointment of an interpreter.
It is important to note that these cases that rely on the due process clause as the source
of a right to an interpreter perceive the trial as a proceeding to pronounce and test factual
assertions. In this context the accused may play a useful part in his defense because he, if
anyone, should know what actually happened. Defendants have been denied interpreters at
hearings where only questions of law are at issue. In United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d
486 (2d Cir. 1962), the court rejected a claim that due process was denied when no
interpreter was provided the defendant at a hearing to determine the court's jurisdiction.
Such holdings indicate that the preparation of legal arguments is usually the job of the
defendant's lawyer, and as long as the lawyer can understand the proceedings, fairness is
assured. This argument is quite persuasive since any other position would result in increased
costs without a corresponding increment of fundamental fairness.
45 430 P.2d 834 (Old. Crim. 1967).
46 480 P.2d 273 (Okl. Grim. 1971).
47 192 Cal. App. 2d 604, 13 Gal. Rptr. 466 (1961).
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that "he did not with intelligent understanding waive his right to
counsel. 48
D. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Only one state, New Mexico, provides in its state constitution
for the right of the accused to have an interpreter. 49 A majority of
states have statutory provisions dealing with problems of non-
English-speaking persons in a criminal proceeding.50 Most states
either provide for the use of interpreters when a witness is incapa-
ble of hearing or understanding the English language or is incapa-
ble of expressing himself in the English language in a manner that
the court, jury, or counsel can understand directly. 51 The problem
with this formulation is that it clearly illustrates the tendency of the
courts to appoint interpreters for the benefit of the court rather
than for the welfare of the defendant. The New Jersey statute
specifically provides for the appointment of an interpreter
whenever such will expedite or improve the transaction of judicial
business. In addition, it limits the use of interpreters to certain
enumerated languages.52
The use of interpreters in the federal courts is governed by
Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection
and may fix the reasonable compensation of such interpreter.
Such compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law or
by the- government, as the court may direct.
The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules
specifically acknowledged that an interpreter may be needed to
interpret the testimony of non-English-speaking witnesses or to
assist non-English-speaking defendants in understanding the pro-
ceedings or in communicating with assigned counsel.
5 3
48 Id- at 605-06, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
49 N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14, which provides in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend himself in person, and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have the charge and
testimony interpreted to him in a language that he understands ...
50 For a brief discussion of different state statutory provisions, see Note, The Right
to an Interpreter, 25 RUTGERS L. Rv. 145, 147-48 (1970).
51 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 752(a) (West 1966); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 165-11
(Smith-Hurd 1973).
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:11-28 (Supp. 1975). The enumerated languages are Italian,
German, Polish, Russian, Spanish, Yiddish, Hungarian, Slavic, and Greek.
53 See FED. R. GruM. P. 28(b), Advisory Committee Note. Senator John Tunney has
introduced the Bilingual Courts Act (S. 565, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)), which was passed
[Vol. 61:289
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It should be noted that these statutory provisions do not
effectively add to any federal or state constitutional right. Courts
are directed to appoint interpreters only when they deem it neces-
sary.5 4 The result is that appointment of an interpreter is still left
to the discretion of the trial court. However, a judge may be more
inclined to exercise that discretion pursuant to a clear statutory
authorization as opposed to case-law precedent.
II
TRADITIONAL ROADBLOCKS TO THE APPOINTMENT
OF AN INTERPRETER
A. Waiver by Silence
Cases recognizing the right to an interpreter often arise in
situations where the absence of an interpreter at trial does not
constitute a violation of defendant's rights. Many such appellate
decisions rely on precedent allowing an intelligent relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right.55 Despite the possibility that a
defendant (even with counsel) has no knowledge of his right to an
interpreter, courts have gone quite far to infer a waiver of an
interpreter from the defendant's silence.
The first significant discussion of the "waiver by silence" doc-
trine came in State v. Rusos.5 6 Exhibiting a concern for judicial
efficiency the court placed the burden on the defendant and his
counsel to notify the court of language difficulties.
57
In a more recent case, People v. Ramos, 58 the court argued that
by the Senate (121 CONG. REC. S12445-46 (daily ed. July 14, 1975)) and sent to the House
(121 CONG. Rc. H6821 (daily ed. July 15, 1975)). The bill provides for more effective
bilingual proceedings in the federal district courts. The legislation provides that whenever
the trial judge determines, on his own motion or that of a party to the proceeding, that an
interpreter is needed, one should be provided for an accused or a witness. The act mandates
the use of certified interpreters and permits electronic recordings of the proceedings for
verification of the translated testimony.
'4 See, ".g., People v. Soldat, 32 Ill. 2d 478, 207 N.E.2d 449 (1965); State v. Aguelera,
326 Mo. 1205, 33 S.W.2d 901 (1930).
'5 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
56 127 Wash. 65, 219 P. 843 (1923).
'7 The court in Rusos explained:
Appellant and his counsel knew, if anyone did, of his lack of fluency in the
English tongue, how comprehensible and intelligible his language was, and what, if
any, difficulties a stranger might have in grasping his meaning. Hence it was their
duty to call the attention of the court to the necessity for an interpreter, if there was
such necessity. Not having done so is an admission that they believed no interpreter
necessary. ...
Id. at 66, 219 P. at 844.
58 26 N.Y.2d 272, 258 N.E.2d 197, 309 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1970).
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the "waiver by silence" position was necessary to avoid useless
litigation and to protect the interests of the prosecution in convict-
ing the guilty with the least expenditure of time and effort. If
courts could not legitimately infer a waiver of the right to an
interpreter from the failure of the defense to request such services,
it would be possible for a defendant to remain silent throughout
the trial, and take a chance of a favorable verdict-failing in
which, he could secure a new trial upon the ground that he did
not understand the language in which the testimony was given.
The absurdity of such a proposition is self-evident. 59
Ramos is only one of a number of cases exhibiting the vitality of
the "waiver by silence" doctrine, 60 despite the recent Supreme
Court cases holding that the waiver of a constitutional right should
not be presumed upon a silent record.61 For example, in Henry v.
Mississippi,62 the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine which
precludes the review of an error unless an objection was raised at
trial does not apply when the issues involved concern deprivation
of a fundamental constitutional right. It is also important to note
that the arguments offered in Rusos and Ramos assume that the
defendant either actually speaks English or at least is aware of his
right to an interpreter. The latter assumption presumes adequate
representation by a lawyer who is aware of that right. Inadequate
representation, or communication difficulties between the accused
and his attorney, however, could leave the non-English-speaking
defendant without any knowledge of his right to an interpreter.
Again, the severe burden of proof concerning the sixth amend-
ment claim of inadequacy of counsel63 probably would block a
reversal of a conviction at a trial in which the defendant was
inadequately represented.
59 Id. at 275, 258 N.E.2d at 198-99, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
60 See, e.g., People v. Estany, 210 Cal. App. 2d 609, 26 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1962); People v.
Medina, 24 App. Div. 2d 516, 261 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1965); see also Duroff v.
Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 31, 232 S.W. 47 (1921); Zunago v. State, 63 Tex. Grim. 58, 138
S.W. 713 (1911).
61 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 747 (1969); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969) (involving the alleged waiver of the right to ajury trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (involving waiver of the right to counsel at pretrial custodial examinations of
the defendant and waiver of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination);
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (involving a waiver of the right to an appointed
counsel).
62 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
6' See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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B. Standard for the Appointment of an Interpreter
The trial court judge makes the decision whether to appoint
an interpreter. Formal standards regarding when a translator
should be appointed are not necessarily used. Instead, it has most
often been held that such a determination is within the discretion
of the judge.64 Other courts have refined this formulation by
stating that the judge has discretion only when it is clear that a
person can in some way communicate in English. Otherwise it is
mandatory that the judge appoint a translator.65
The test for abuse of discretion is generally whether the
failure *to appoint a translator has hampered the defendant in any
manner in presenting his case fairly to the jury.66 This same test is
applied where the court has failed to appoint an interpreter to
assist a non-English-speaking witness.67 Many courts have been
quite strict in applying the test. In People v. Ramos, 68 for example,
the court stated that the trial judge should investigate the possible
need for an interpreter "[o]nly when it becomes acutely obviotis
that the defendant is exhibiting an inability to understand the trial
proceedings or to communicate with his counsel due to a language
barrier .... "69
64 For cases in which requests for interpreters were denied under this formulation, see
Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86 (1907); United States v. Sosa, 379 F.2d 525 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967); Suarez v, United States, 309 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1962).
For a case in which an interpreter was appointed, see Kelly v. State, 278 So. 2d 400 (Miss.
1973), where the court relied upon Miss. CODE ANN. § 1529 (1956), which authorized use of
an interpreter when "necessary."
65 People v. Annett, 251 Cal. App. 2d 858, 59 Cal. Rptr. 888, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029
(1967).
66 United States v. Sosa, 379 F.2d 525 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967);
Viliborghi v. State, 45 Ariz. 275,43 P.2d 210 (1935); State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d
903 (1942).
rl See, e.g., Duroff v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 31, 232 S.W. 47 (1921).
The trial court is vested with a broad discretion in the matter of calling an
interpreter, to be exercised according to the facts of each case. If the witnesses are
unable to understand and speak the English language the court should either on
motion or on its own knowledge call a competent qualified person to translate and
interpret the questions propounded and the answers given thereto, but where the
witnesses are able to understand and speak the English language, even imperfectly,
but so as to make themselves understood and to convey their thoughts and ideas, no
interpreter should be called or allowed.
Id. at 34, 232 S.W. at 49.
68 26 N.Y.2d 272, 258 N.E.2d 197, 309 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1970).
69 Id. at 275, 258 N.E,2d at 199, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 909. One interesting argument in
favor of a standard that would minimize the appointments of interpreters was noted in
United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974),
where the court expressed reservations about the use of an interpreter on cross-examination
when one had hardly been used on direct.The court feared that in cases in which the need
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Some courts apparently fail to realize the seriousness of the
protestations of non-English-speaking defendants. In State v.
Faafiti,70 the accused, a native Samoan, was denied an interpreter
when he testified before the jury. The court stated that although the
defendant did not speak grammatically correct English, he had
sufficient command of the language to understand the questions
and convey his thoughts to the jury.71 The court emphasized that a
defendant's lack of complete familiarity with the English language
does not automatically entitle him to have an interpreter. The
court, in fact, made a total mockery of the defendant's claim by
quipping that few native English speakers are "completely familiar
with the English language.... [a] fact.., substantiated in decisions
of this court and other supreme courts which show obvious gram-
matical errors.' 72 The substantial difficulties of the defendant were
thus lightly discarded.
In Diaz v. State73 the court's approach to the plight of non-
English-speaking defendants was equally callous. The defendant, a
Latin American, unsuccessfully appealed his conviction for attempt-
ed rape on the ground that the court failed to appoint an in-
terpreter to assist him with his testimony.74 In deciding that there
for an interpreter was questionable, the defense could request that the prosecutor slacken
the pace of cross-examination and rephrase questions so that the defendant would not be
confused.
70 54 Haw. 637, 513 P.2d 697 (1973).
1 The court in Faafiti stated:
We do not agree with the defendant that whenever a defendant "is not completely
familiar with English," upon his request as a matter of right he is entitled to an
interpreter. In the first place, how many of us even though educated in the United
States are completely familiar with the English language?
Id at 639, 513 P.2d at 699 (emphasis in original).
72 Id. at 639 n.1, 513 P.2d at 699 n.1.
73 491 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
"" The trial record showed the following exchanges:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
If the Court please, let me rephrase that. Thomas,-Your Honor, there is going to
be some difficulty of communication here, there always has been. This man does
not really fully understand English.
THE COURT:
I will permit you to go beyond the normal English speaking standard, but make
your leading be the minimum.
And later,
Q [by defense counsel]:
Well, the question I'm asking you and you-you answered partly right and
partly-I don't think you-either you misunderstood me or something. What you
are saying is, that you have in the past drank enough that you had no knowledge of
what was going on around you and no recollection of what had happened to you or
where you had been, is this true?
A:
I wish I can have a interpreter, but I don't have a interpreter. See, sometimes I say
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was "ample evidence that appellant understood and communicated
in the English language reasonably well,' '7 5 the appellate court
cited several factors throughout the opinion: appellant answered,
"not guilty sir," upon the reading of the indictment; "there was no
showing that his counsel could not and did not communicate in
Spanish with appellant [and] . . .a defense witness stated that
[Diaz] did not speak fluent English. 17 6 In addition, the court noted
that "[t]here was no request for an interpreter" 77 although the
defendant specifically told his lawyer in open court that he wanted
an interpreter. The court then not only ignored Diaz's language
difficulties but also ignored his request for assistance in testifying.
A further problem in appellate review of a trial court record is
the weight that is sometimes accorded simple or monosyllabic
answers to questions from the defense counsel, the district attor-
ney, or the judge. There is a danger that a decision to affirm a
conviction will be based on "yes" or "no" answers given by the
defendant when he does not fully understand the consequences of
his statements.7 8 It is readily apparent that an appellant may easily
respond to a question in such a manner yet not speak English. 79
Given the perfunctory questions often asked at the time of ar-
raignment or guilty plea, a defendant may still need an interpreter
so he can comprehend the significance of a particular question or
action.
III
MOVEMENT TOWARD HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER
Several courts have forthrightly rejected the casual and indif-
ferent attitude traditionally taken with regard to language difficul-
ties in criminal trials. For example, in State v. Natividad80 the court
something I'm not supposed to say and sometimes I say something wrong. I just say
what I know the way-
ThE COURTZ
You just listen very carefully to the man's questions. I think you can get along all
right, to either of the lawyers, they'll put their questions to you pretty clearly, I
think.
ld at 167.
75 Id. at 168.
76 Id. at 167-68.
77 Id. at 168.
7' For an example of reliance on "yes" and "no" responses, see People v. Annett, 251
Cal. App. 858, 59 Cal. Rptr. 888, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1967).
7 In re Muraviov, 192 Cal. App. 2d 604, 13 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1961).
80 IlI Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d 730 (1974).
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denied that a failure to make a request for an interpreter at trial
constituted a proper waiver. 8 1 The court in State v. Vasquez8 2 also
cautioned against casual refusal of an interpreter for a non-
English-speaking defendant and analyzed the hidden inequities
that may result from such a refusal. 83
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 84 similarly noted that a
defendant's failure to request an interpreter cannot be taken as a
passive waiver. Not only may the defendant be unaccustomed to
asserting his personal rights, but he may never realize or under-
stand that he has such rights until it is too late. The court notice-
ably departed from past holdings, stating that a court, given notice
of a defendant's severe language difficulty, is obligated to "make
unmistakably clear to [the accused] that he has a right to have a
competent translator assist him, at state expense if need be,
throughout his trial. '85
This notification requirement certainly decreases the danger
81 The court in Natividad stated:
A defendant who passively observes in a state of complete incomprehension the
complex wheels ofjustice grind on before him can hardly be said to have satisfied
the classic definition of a waiver as "the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of
a known right." City of Tucson v. Koerber, 82 Ariz. 347, 313 P.2d 411 (1957);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Gt. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1937). This would be
especially true with a Mexican national during his initial contact with our judicial
system.
Id. at-, 526 P.2d at 733. See also In re Muraviov, 192 Cal. App. 2d 604, 13 Cal. Rptr. 466
(1961).
82 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903 (1942).
83 The court in Vasquez observed:
Degrees of understanding may present themselves between that of complete
comprehension of the language to that of minor matters. The question, not
properly heard or understood, may bring forth an answer that might turn the
scales from innocence to guilt or from guilt to innocence. Then, too, the answer
given might be made in words not entirely familiar or understood by the defen-
dant.....
While English has comparatively few inflections, either a prefix or a suffix
mistakenly applied or interpreted may change the meaning of a whole sentence.
Id. at 450, 121 P.2d at 905-06.
84 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
s5 Id. at 391. Even after the Second Circuits decision in Negron, New York State courts
do not have to follow this procedure. People v. Ramos, 31 App. Div. 2d 815, 297 N.Y.S.2d
886 (2d Dep't 1969), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 272, 258 N.E.2d 197, 309 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1970). The
highest state courts and the lower federal courts are separate jurisdictions standing on equal
footing, both governed by the same reviewing authority of the United States Supreme
Court. Therefore a federal court decision is not controlling in a state court. United States ex
rel. Meyer v. Weil, 458 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Ralph v.
Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); United States ex reL
Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); People
v. Stansberry, 47 Ill. 2d 541, 268 N.E.2d 431, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971); State v.
Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966).
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that a non-English-speaking defendant may go through his trial
without comprehending the testimony offered therein. The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v.
Carrion,s6 placed an even greater burden on the trial court to
assure that the defendant is cognizant of his rights. The First
Circuit considered it to be the duty of the trial court to make an
investigation to determine whether an interpreter is necessary, with
a requirement that the court make clear to a defendant with a
possible language difficulty his right to have a court-appointed
interpreter.8 7
Texas and Utah courts have also held that once the trial court
learns that a defendant has difficulty speaking English, it is neces-
sary for the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to inquire and
ascertain whether the accused needs an interpreter to safeguard
his rights. 88 For example, in State v. Karumai8 9 the court stated that
"it is the duty of the Court to take whatever steps are necessary to
prevent injustice and, if necessary, the Court should, on its own
motion, appoint an interpreter for the defendant at the State's
expense. ' 0
In considering whether a hearing should be conducted con-
cerning the need for an interpreter, at least one court, the Second
Circuit in Negron, has analogized the situation to that of persons of
questionable mental competency. In such an instance, where the
evidence raises a "bona fide doubt" as to a defendant's competence
to stand trial, the judge on his own motion must impanel a jury
and conduct a sanity hearing.91 Further, the Supreme Court in
Dusky v. United States,92 in defining legal mental incompetency, set a
fairly high standard.9
86 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1973).
87 The court in Carrion elaborated:
[The trial court] should make unmistakably clear to a defendant who may have a
language difficulty that he has a right to a court-appointed interpreter if the court
determines that one is needed, and, whenever put on notice that there may be some
significant language difficulty, the court should make such a determination of need.
Id at 15.
88 Garcia v. State, 151 Tex. Grim. 593, 210 S.W.2d 574 (1948); State v. Vasquez, 101
Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903 (1942).
89 101 Utah 592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942).
890 Id. at 599, 126 P.2d at 1050.
91 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
92 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
93 [I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that "the defendant [is] oriented
to time and place and [has] some recollection of events," but that the "test must be
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."
Id. at 402.
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The non-English-speaking defendant, unable to consult with
his English-speaking lawyer, is in the same position as the mental
incompetent. In addition, without the aid of interpretation the
accused may well not have the requisite factual understanding of
the proceedings against him and be unable to aid in his own
defense. This clearly raises a "bona fide doubt" as to the defen-
dant's competence to stand trial. Because it would be a violation of
due process to convict a person who is legally incompetent,94 a
hearing should be conducted to determine the accused's ability to
communicate and participate in his own trial95 without an interpre-
ter. If it were possible for incompetents to waive the hearing, it
would be a rather hollow right.
Several appellate courts have remanded cases to the trial court
for a hearing to determine whether the defendant's alleged lan-
guage difficulty gave him the right to an interpreter at trial.96 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Atilus v.
United States, 97 ordered a hearing on the severity of the defendant's
language problem upon his claim that it was impossible for him to
understand the proceedings at trial despite the fact that an official
interpreter did participate to a degree in the trial. The Fifth
Circuit has also held that once a witness has requested an inter-
preter, the trial court in making its determination is obligated to
make a preliminary inquiry as to the necessity of appointing a
translator.98
A hearing, such as those required by Carrion and Atilus, was
actually held by a trial court on its own initiative in Kelly v. State. 99
The judge interrupted the proceedings to make the determination,
in chambers, that an interpreter was needed after he had heard the
defendant answer less than a dozen questions on the witness stand.
Lastly, many courts are concerned with the special problems of
non-English-speaking persons who are called upon to be witnesses
9' See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582
(D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 961 (1956) (per curiam).
95 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
96 See, e.g., State v. Natividad, 111 Ariz. 191, -, 526 P.2d 730, 733-34 (1974):
The decision of the trial court will be adhered to in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion. There is no evidence in the record before us to indicate the lower court
'made a finding on this issue.
Accordingly we remand the .ase in order that a hearing may be held to
establish the nature and severity of any language difficulty and to determine
whether the defendant in the instant case was entitled to be informed of his right to
an interpreter under the criteria discussed above.
97 378 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1967).
98 Pietrzak v. United States, 188 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1951).
99 278 So. 2d 400 (Miss. 1973).
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at criminal trials. 00 Some courts allow counsel to ask leading
questions of witnesses who are using an interpreter to facilitate the
proceeding. Indeed, in Diaz v. State,1 1 the trial judge allowed
defense counsel to ask leading questions of the accused himself in
order to minimize at least partially the language problems.
IV
THE SELECTION, COMPETENCE, AND DUTY OF AN INTERPRETER
Once the decision has been made to provide an interpreter,
either for a witness or for the accused, it has been uniformly
held that the trial court is given wide discretion as to whom to
appoint. 0 2 Although interpreters with an interest in the proceed-
ing should be avoided, 103 judges have not hesitated to use partisan
translators. Convictions have been affirmed despite the use of an
interpreter who was the deputy sheriff who helped investigate and
arrest the accused, 0 4 the injured complainant, 0 5 a witness, 0 6 an
employee in the county attorney's office, 0 7 the defendant in a
prior civil suit brought by the accused, 0 8 or a co-defendant being
tried with the accused.'09 The courts have also permitted the
interpreter to be the wife of the witness" 0 and even the mother of
the raped girl who needed to testify."' One court went so far as to
state that there was no requirement that an interpreter should be
unbiased toward the defendant. 1 2 Despite these decisions, the
100 See, e.g., "People v. Brown, 273 III. 169, 112 N.E. 462 (1916). In helping such a
witness, counsel here was instructed not to directly indicate or suggest the answers he
desired. See also text accompanying note 53 supra.
101 491 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
102 United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936
(1972); Chee v. United States, 449 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1971); Gil v. State, 266 So. 2d 43 (Fla.
App. 1972), cert. denied, 271 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1973).
103 Mislik v. State, 184 Ind. 72, 110 N.E. 551 (1915); Bustillos v. State, 464 S.W.2d 118
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
104 State v. Firmatura, 121 La. 676, 46 So. 691 (1908) (murder).
105 Sellers v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 140, 134 S.W. 348 (1911) (assault).
106 Green v. State, 260 A.2d 706 (Del. 1969) (robbery).
107 Bustillos v. State, 464 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (assault with intent to
murder).
108 State v. Boulet, 5 Wash. 2d 654, 106 P.2d 311 (1940) (grand larceny).
109 People v. Rivera, 13 Ill. App. 3d 264, 300 N.E.2d 869 (1973) (unlawful possession of
narcotics).
110 United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 936
(1972) (affirming conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce).
11 Almon v. State, 21 Ala. App. 466, 109 So. 371 (1926) (although rape conviction was
reversed due to insufficiency of evidence).
112 Brown v. State, 59 S.W. 1118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900) (theft conviction affirmed).
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court in Lujan v. United States 1 3 expressed the generally accepted
view:
While in the nature of things, a disinterested interpreter is
essential to an impartial interpretation of a witness' testimony, at
the same time the trial court is necessarily accorded a wide
discretion in determining the fitness of the person called, and the
exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on review in the
absence of some evidence from which prejudice can be in-
ferred.
1 14
In Lujan, the defendant, an American Indian, unsuccessfully ob-
jected to the use of an interpreter who was a blood relative of some
of the government's witnesses. The problem was remedied by the
use of a "counter-interpreter" who sat at the defense table and
corrected the first interpreter if necessary. In addition, the second
interpreter was used for Indian defense witnesses.
Only in very rare instances have judgments been reversed due
to partisan interpretation. In one instance, the appointment of the
husband of a deaf mute victim in a prosecution for burglary and
attempted rape was held to be fundamentally unfair and violative
of due process. In that case, Prince v. Beto, 1 5 the husband had
attempted to extort one hundred dollars from the accused by
promising that he would stop the prosecution. In reversing the
conviction, the court did point out that the husband was an
"intensely interested party" and that there would be "few situations
[with] greater potential for bias."
'"1 6
The question whether the interpreter is competent is also a
discretionary decision to be made by the trial court." 7 It is quite
unusual, however, for an appellate court to reverse a conviction on
113 209 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1953).
114 Id. at 192.
1Is 426 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1970).
'16 Id. at 877. See also People v. Allen, 22 111. App. 3d 800, 317 N.E.2d 633 (1974),
where a conviction for aggravated battery was reversed due to the use of an interpreter who
was a close personal friend of the complaining witness, a witness at the trial for the
prosecution, and also had personal knowledge of the facts of the case. The United States
Supreme Court has decided one case in which a biased interpreter was a factor. In Marino v.
Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947), a judgment was vacated upon a petition of habeas corpus. The
accused, an 18-year-old who had been in the United States for two years and did not
understand English, pleaded guilty after two interpreters, one of whom was his arresting
officer, had supposedly told him of the consequences of the plea. Before pleading guilty, the
defendant never received the assistance of counsel. The Court, in holding that there was a
denial of due process, based its decision on the absence of an attorney.
117 Hardin v. United States, 324 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1963); People v. Mendes, 35 Cal. 2d
537, 219 P.2d 1 (1950).
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this basis.11 a One problem in reviewing the competence of the
interpreter is that there is no trial transcript to reflect the interac-
tion between the witness or accused and the interpreter. The
record consists only of the translated remarks of the witness. 1 9
The only way to review thoroughly the interpreter's performance
is to review the English record with the witness and another
interpreter to see if the witness believes that the translation is
accurate. This approach is obviously quite impractical. As an alter-
native, the accused could have the option of requesting the compi-
lation of a bilingual record. The cost of employing the needed
extra personnel, however, would be prohibitive, and it would
probably be very difficult to get a court stenographer for each of
the different languages used. To take advantage of this service, or
alternatively to utilize a tape recording of the proceeding, the
defendant also would have to find an independent person who
could analyze the translation. 20 A final consideration militating
against such a step would be the infrequency with which the extra
transcript would actually be used to review the work of the in-
terpreter. In any event, proving the requisite prejudice to secure a
reversal would be very difficult.'12  Without a showing of major
errors, courts would probably hold slight confusions or misun-
derstandings to be harmless error and affirm the lower court
judgment.
Further, some courts have noted that if an objection to
an interpreter is not made at trial, the accused has waived his
right to object in a later proceeding.12 2 Again, the logic of this
position is not convincing. Unless there is a bilingual person
assisting the defense at the time of trial, there is no competent
person to judge the performance of the interpreter. Without the
attendance of such a person, it would, be necessary for an indepen-
dent party to review the proceeding after the trial is completed. If
118 In Kelly v. State, 96 Fla. 348, 118 So. 1 (1928), a death sentence was reversed when
it turned out that the two interpreters did not speak the same language as the defendant.
I'l Properly transcribed, interpreted testimony is treated with the same weight and in
the same way as ordinary English testimony. People v. Lopez, 21 Cal. App. 188, 131 P. 104
(1913).
120 Cf. note 53 supra.
121 See, e.g., Lujan v. United States, 209 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1953).
122 See United States v. Diaz Berrios, 441 F.2d 1125 (2d Cir. 1971); Gonzalez v. Virgin
Islands, 109 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1940); Gil v. State, 266 So. 2d 43 (Fla. App. 1972), cert. denied,
271 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1973) (squarely holding that failure to object at trial precludes raising
issue for first time at subsequent proceedings).
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at that time, however, it can be shown that the translation was
prejudicially inadequate, it makes little sense to dismiss an appeal
due to lack of timely objection during trial.
The method an interpreter should use in translating testimony
for the court and the accused has been largely ignored in discus-
sions of the role and effect of an interpreter in a criminal proceed-
ing. A distinction should be noted between the use of an inter-
preter for a witness in testifying and for the accused in listening.
Although some courts require the translator to give a verbatim
translation of what the witness states, 123 other courts have allowed
responses in the third person.' 24 Whichever method is used, it is
then up to the jury to assess the credibility of the witness by
watching the interaction between the interpreter and the person
testifying.
125
The real controversy over the responsibility of a translator
concerns the service provided for the accused at the defense table.
An interpreter could provide simultaneous translation of the wit-
ness's testimony or he could be used as the defendant desires
without the perfection of instant translation. The best-reasoned
analysis appears in the lower court decision in Negron:
In order to afford Negron his right to confrontation, it was
necessary under the circumstances that he be provided with a
simultaneous translation of what was being said for the purpose
of communicating with his attorney to enable the latter to effec-
tively cross-examine those English-speaking witnesses to test their
credibility, their memory and their accuracy of observation in
the light of Negron's version of the facts.
126
Simultaneous translation better protects the accused in fully exer-
cising his constitutional rights and in receiving the best defense
possible by being able to follow the court proceeding and com-
municate at all times with counsel.
123 See People v. Jackson, 53 Cal. 2d 89, 346 P.2d 389, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 977 (1959);
People v. Wong Ah Bang, 65 Cal. 305, 4 p. 19 (1884); Rajnowski v. Detroit, B.C: & A.R. Co.,
74 Mich. 15, 41 N.W. 849 (1889); Prokop v. State, 148 Neb. 582, 28 N.W.2d 200 (1947).
1 For example, the translator might translate the remarks of the witness saying "he
said he went to the bank," instead of "I went to the bank." See People v. Jackson, 53 Cal. 2d
89, 346 P.2d 389 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 977 (1960), where such responses were allowed
as nonprejudicial, but the court said the duty of an interpreter was to repeat answers
verbatim. However, Piokop v. State, 148 Neb. 582, 28 N.W.2d 200 (1947), which affirmed
the trial court's requirement of a verbatim translation, specifically cautioned against such a
method. Id. at 584, 28 N.W.2d at 202.
125 Hensley v. State, 228 Ga. 501, 186 S.E.2d 729 (1972).
126 United States ex reL Negron v. New York, 310 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (E.D.N.Y.), aff d,
434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
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CONCLUSION
Recent cases have come a long way toward establishing a right
to an interpreter for non-English-speaking defendants. This right
is based on confrontation, cross-examination, and due process
grounds. Affirmative duties have been imposed by some appellate
courts concerning the discretion of trial judges to protect this
newly-won right. Slowly, advances are also being made in the com-
petence of the interpreters who are assigned to aid defendants. All
these events are long overdue in a nation marked by significant
cultural diversity. Hopefully, our courts and legislatures will be-
come even more cognizant of the severe handicap inherent in the
inability to communicate and will ensure that when an issue so
important as one's personal freedom is at stake language barriers
will be reduced.
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